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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

:

BENJAMIN MATTHEW NUNLEY,

:

Case No. 20000196-C A

:

Priority 15

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Defendant appeals from a restitution order entered following his judgment and
conviction for attempted aggravated assault, a Class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. §§ 76-4-101 & -5-103 (1999). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
May a court increase an order of restitution if, after entry of the judgment and
conviction, the defendant requests a full restitution hearing and the resulting,
uncontradicted evidence establishes that the prior restitution order was incorrect?
An appellate court will uphold a trial court's restitution order unless the order
exceeds that legally permissible or the trial court otherwise abused its discretion. State v.
Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 653 (Utah App. 1997). Because defendant failed to object to

the legality of the restitution order, appellate consideration of the issue is waived. State v.
Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 1987) (recognizing general preservation requirement);
State v. Snyder, 141 P.2d AM, All (Utah App. 1987) (failure to object to restitution order
waives appellate challenge).
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
If this Court determines that appellate review is not waived, the following
provisions, copied in Addendum D, are determinative of the merits:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (1999) - Definitions - Sentences or combination
of sentences allowed - Civil penalties - Restitution - Hearing.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (1999) - Suspension of sentence - Pleas held in
abeyance - Probation - Supervision - Presentence investigation - Standards
- Confidentiality - Terms and conditions - Restitution - Termination,
revocation, modification, or extension - Hearings - Electronic Monitoring.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with aggravated assault, a third degree felony, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1999) (R. 1-2). On November 17, 1999, pursuant to a
plea bargain, defendant pled guilty to a reduced charge of attempted aggravated assault, a
Class A misdemeanor (R. 20-22). On January 11, 2000, the court sentenced defendant to
365 days in jail, but then suspended incarceration and placed defendant on probation,
upon condition that he pay $16,000.00 in restitution and attend anger management classes
(R. 41-43; and R. 65: 16-20). See Addendum C for copy of Judgment and Conviction.
Defendant did not object to or appeal the judgment.
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Thirty-five days later, on February 15, 2000, defendant requested a restitution
hearing, which request was granted (R. 44, 64). Based on the subsequent hearing's
uncontradicted, documented evidence that the victim's pecuniary damages amounted to
$19,646.15, and not $16,000.00 as reported in the presentence report, the trial court
ordered defendant to pay the increased amount (R. 64: 4-21). See Addendum A for copy
of Restitution Order.1
Defendant appeals the February order (R. 46).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant: "I made a bad decision and got a baseball bat
from the car and struck [the victim] in the leg."
On March 16, 1999, defendant got into an argument with Joe Pilcher, a driver who
allegedly "cut [defendant] off as defendant and his son drove home (R. 2, 20; see also
Presentence Report [PSR] at 2-4). During the ensuing altercation, defendant retrieved his
son's baseball bat from his car and hit Mr. Pilcher with the bat on the leg and knee (id.).
Mr. Pilcher required medical treatment and was, out-of-work for six weeks (R. 64: 4-8; R.
65: 4-7; PSR at 4).
Pursuant to a plea bargain, defendant pled guilty to a Class A misdemeanor.
Before sentencing, defendant admitted that hitting the victim with a baseball bat was a

1

The record on appeal does not contain a copy of the February 22, 2000,
restitution order, however, defendant has attached a copy of the order to his brief. See
Brief of Appellant [Br.App.], Addendum A. The State does not contest the accuracy of
defendant's copy.
3

"terrible choice and something that is not acceptable for any reason under any
circumstances" (PSR at 3). Defendant was
completely sorry this took place and I would willingly & gladly like to
appologize [sic] to [the victim] and his family and will do anything I can to
try to redeem myself for any suffering I have caused. I truly want him to
know I am sincerely sorry and I am totaly [sic] ashamed to know I am
responsible for the trouble I have caused.
(id.).
The presentence report stated that the victim's undocumented pecuniary damages
were $16,000, estimated at $500.00 for medical expenses and $15,000.00 for lost
earnings as a plumbing contractor (PSR at 5; R. 65: 4-5). At sentencing, defendant said
he could make full restitution based on his meat-cutter's job, which paid $14.33 an hour
for a 56-72 hour-week or approximately $3,210.00 to $4,127.00 monthly (R. 65: 6-7).
Despite defendant's apparent remorse, Adult Probation and Parole recommended
incarceration for the full statutory term due to defendant's admitted inability to control his
anger and his prior history of assault-related offenses (PSR at 17). The trial court agreed
that defendant "deserve[d] jail," but was "torn" by a desire to make the victim "as whole
as I can" (R. 65: 16). Because incarceration would hinder defendant's ability to "get Mr.
Pilcher the money he deserved" (R. 64: 17), the court imposed but suspended the jail
sentence and placed defendant on probation, upon condition that he attend anger
management classes and pay $1000.00 a month towards the estimated $16,000.00
restitution (R. 64: 17-20). See Addendum C (Judgment). Defendant did not object or
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request a restitution hearing during the sentencing proceedings; nor did he appeal from
the judgment and conviction.
The victim: "And that's figuring low, too. I've been giving
Mr. Nunley the benefit of the doubt the whole way."
On February 15, 2000, some thirty-five days after entry of the criminal judgment,
defendant requested a full restitution hearing (R. 44). Despite the untimeliness of the
motion,2 the trial court granted defendant's request.
One week later, on February 22, 2000, an evidentiary hearing was held (R. 64).
The victim testified and produced documents which established his lost earnings at
$19,125.00, and his out-of-pocket medical expenses at $521.15 (R. 64: 4-16, 21). In
providing a detailed explanation for the higher figures, some $3646.15 over the
undocumented estimate contained in the presentence report, the victim explained that he
was "figuring low" and "giving Mr. Nunley the benefit of the doubt the whole way" (R.
64: 16). Defendant did not call any witnesses or produce any evidence which
contradicted the victim's testimony (R. 64: 21-26). Nor did defense counsel argue against
the $19,646.15 total figure or assert any legal reason why the trial court could not adjust
the restitution amount upwards. Instead, following the prosecutor's request for the higher
figure to be imposed, defense counsel said he would "submit it" (R. 64: 21).
The court then queried defendant directly about when his first payment was due

2

See discussion, infra at 10 n.4.
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(R. 64: 21), after which the following exchange took place:
Court: Any question you have?
Defendant: I - I'm confused on the whole - the whole reason for this
hearing. I was already sentenced to $16,000 Court: You were.
Defendant: - and now it's changing to the 19-something.
Court: 19,646.15. So, the question is?
Defendant: So, my amount - the amount of money I'm supposed to be
paying back has changed now?
Court: Un huh. And what is your question?
Defendant: I have a problem with that because Court: Well, do you have a question or just want to make a statement?
Defendant: I want to make a whole lot of statements.
Court: Okay. Go ahead.
Defendant: I talked to two acquaintances of mine, one is a - has his
master's in plumbing, one owns his own plumbing company.
(R. 64: 21-22). Defendant continued to explain that his "acquaintances" thought the
victim's invoices might be "fabricated and there could be other employees doing the
work" (R. 64: 22). When the court asked where these witnesses were, defendant
responded that he did not know they needed to testify at the hearing (R. 64: 22-24). The
court explained that it would not accept defendant's unsworn summary of what others
might say, advised defendant to consult with his attorney, and said that if they then
wished, they could "notice up" a hearing to present "contradictory evidence" (R. 64: 26).3
Otherwise, the court felt "comfortable with the substantialness [sic] of the proof

3

The court also rejected defendant's request for the victim's tax return because
Mr. Pilcher testified that the March-April period, during which his* unemployment
occurred, was his busiest time and "carried" him through the slower winter months (R.
64: 6-9, 25-26). His total yearly earnings were, therefore, not determinative (R. 64: 2526).
6

presented at the hearing (R. 64: 25). See Addendum B for transcript of this exchange.
Defense counsel remained silent and never requested a further evidentiary hearing.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant does not dispute that the victim suffered $19,646.15 in pecuniary
damages, or that, at minimum, he owes the victim $16,000.00 in restitution. The only
issue is whether, having relied on the undocumented estimate of $16,000.00, the court
could thereafter increase restitution by $3646.15 based upon the uncontradicted,
documented evidence presented at the restitution hearing. The answer is "yes." A
defendant cannot demand a restitution hearing, only to reject its adverse consequences.
Moreover, the issue is not properly before this Court. Defendant presented no
factual evidence to counter the victim's testimony that he suffered $19646.15 in damages
as a result of defendant's criminal conduct. Nor did defendant present any legal reason
why the court could not increase the amount of restitution based on the undisputed
evidence. Having failed to challenge the restitution order in the trial court, defendant is
now precluded from attacking its legality on appeal.
In sum, defendant failed to preserve his meritless argument.
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ARGUMENT
A TRIAL COURT IS NOT BOUND BY A PRIOR ESTIMATE OF
PECUNIARY DAMAGES IF, FOLLOWING A RESTITUTION
HEARING, THE UNCONTRADICTED EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES
THA T THE PRIOR ESTIMA TE WAS INCORRECT
A. Defendant did not preserve his appellate claim.
This Court will not consider claims raised for the first time on appeal. State v.
Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 1987). Here, defendant did not preserve a challenge to
the legality of the trial court's February restitution order and, therefore, appellate review
is waived. State v. Snyder, 747 P.2d 417,421 (Utah App. 1987).
Utah's statutory scheme provides ample opportunity for a criminal defendant to
challenge a restitution order. Prior to sentencing, a defendant is provided a copy of the
presentence report, which necessarily contains not only an

":mate of the pecuniary

damages incurred by the victim, but also a recommendation regarding payment. Utah
Code Ann. §§ 77-18-l(5)(c) & -(6)(a) (1999). At sentencing, a defendant may challenge
any inaccuracy in the presentence report, Utah Code § 77-18-l(6)(b), and may present any
"testimony, evidence, or information . . . [ h e ] . . . desires . . . concerning the appropriate
sentence, Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(7). Further, a defendant "at the time of sentencing"
may demand a full evidentiary hearing to challenge the "imposition, amount, or
distribution of the restitution" ordered. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(4)(e) (1999). See
Addendum D for copies of statutes cited. Failure to timely object to the amount of
restitution constitutes waiver. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(6)(b) (failure to object to
8

presentence report at time of sentencing constitutes waiver); Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d
1017, 1029 (Utah 1996) (a defendant is not entitled to a restitution hearing unless he
timely requests one at the time of sentencing); Snyder, 747 P.2d at 421 (failure to object
to restitution order below waives appellate review).
Here, defendant did not object to the initial undocumented estimate of $16,000.00
contained in the presentence report (PSR at 3-4). To the contrary, defendant agreed that
the victim had suffered out-of-pocket medical expenses and six weeks of lost earnings as
an independent plumbing contractor during the "busiest" time of the year (R. 65: 4-11).
Nor did defendant challenge the propriety of the judge's announced desire to make the
victim "as whole as I can" (R. 65: 16).
Instead, some thirty-five days after sentencing, defendant requested an evidentiary
hearing pursuant to section 76-3-20 l(4)(e) (R. 44). Despite the untimeliness of the
motion and its lack of specificity, the court granted defendant's request (R. 64).4

4

A defendant has no right to a restitution hearing when he fails to timely request
one at sentencing. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(e); Monson, 928 P.2d at 1029; Snyder,
747 P.2d at 421. A court may, however, cure an untimely claim of error by reaching the
merits of the claim in a post-judgment motion. State v. Belgard, 830 P.2d 264, 266 (Utah
1992) (per curium) ("trial court in effect reopened the trial when it held an evidentiary
hearing" after a bench trial); State v. Matsamas, 808 P.2d 1048, 1053 (Utah 1991)
(same). Here, the hearing was granted without objection and, therefore, the State does not
raise defendant's untimeliness on appeal.
Furthermore, considering the untimeliness of defendant's hearing request would
result in an unjustified windfall for defendant: without the untimely motion, there would
be no evidentiary hearing, and no increased order of restitution. A party may not,
however, gain advantage through invited error. State v. Rudolph, 2000 UT App. 155,
H15, 3 P.3d 192 (citing State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 159 (Utah 1989)).
9

At the hearing one week later, defendant presented no witnesses or documentation
to counter the victim's detailed explanation of his losses. In fact, when the court sought
counsel's response to the higher restitution figure, defense counsel simply "submitted"
the issue (R. 64:21).
Defendant now claims that he - as opposed to his counsel - preserved the issue
when he personally engaged in a colloquy with the court. See Br.App. at 2, 6-7. But a
review of the exchange establishes that defendant only asked, "So, my amount - the
amount of money I'm supposed to be paying back has changed now?", and then opined
that the victim may have "fabricated" the documentation relied upon in reaching the
higher amount (R. 64: 21-22). The remainder of the exchange centered on defendant's
failure to have his "witnesses" at the restitution hearing and the trial court's offer to hold
a future hearing so that defendant could present the testimony of those witnesses, an offer
defendant never accepted (R. 64: 23-26). At no point, did defendant or his counsel claim
that the trial court was without legal authority to enter the increased restitution order. See
Addendum B for complete exchange.
This Court, therefore, should refuse to consider defendant's claim for the first time
on appeal and should summarily affirm the February restitution order.
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B. Even if the issue were preserved, the trial court acted properly in
increasing the amount of restitution based on the uncontradicted
hearing evidence.
Even if the merits of defendant's claim were preserved, his argument is without
merit. The trial court properly increased the amount of restitution owed based on the
uncontradicted hearing evidence.
Utah law accords an order of restitution "'separate legal effect that parallels]
probation in sentencing and judgment.'" State v. Nones, 2000 UT App 211, ^[7, 399 Utah
Adv. Rep. 14 (quoting State v. Dickey, 841 P.2d 1203, 1205 (Utah App. 1992), cert
denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993)). A restitution order may be "enforced as a probation
condition, in accord with section 77-18-1, 'and as a separate and independent component
of the court's judgment and the defendant's original sentence under Utah Code Annotated
sections 76-3-201(3) & -201.1.'" Id. at %9 (quoting Dickey, 841 P.2d at 1207). As such,
an order of restitution in a criminal case serves the "dual purposes" of "compensating the
victim and repaying society." Id. at Tf 14.
Utah courts do not view restitution as punishment. Monson, 928 P.2d at 1026;
Stilling v. Board of Pardons, 933 P.2d 391, 392 (Utah App. 1997). Instead, it is a "civil
penalty whose purpose is entirely remedial, i.e., to compensate victims for the harm
caused by a defendant and whose likely intent is to spare victims the time, expense and
emotional difficulties of separate civil litigation to recover their damages from the
defendant." Monson, 928 P.2d at 1027. Accord Nones, 2000 UT App 211, ^[15 (intent of
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Utah's restitution scheme is to ensure that victims "receive compensation for damages
caused by defendant's crimes"). Cf. State v. Twitchell, 832 P.2d 866, 868 (Utah App.
1992) (purpose of restitution is penal as well as compensatory); Dickey, 841 P.2d at 1209
(purpose of restitution is "multifaceted," with penal, rehabilitative, and compensatory
aspects). By limiting a trial court's power to order restitution to "that amount which is
necessary to compensate a victim for losses caused by the defendant," section 76-3-201
and its related provisions ensure that "restitution serves only its compensatory purpose."
Monson, 928 P.2d at 1027.
Here, defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in increasing
restitution following the restitution hearing. Defendant contends that once the court
entered the January Judgment and Conviction order, which directed defendant to pay
$16,000 in restitution, the trial court only had the authority to decrease the amount of
restitution following the February evidentiary hearing but was prohibited from increasing
it. See Br. App. 10-13. Even though defendant sought reconsideration by requesting a
hearing, he now argues that the resulting order constituted an abuse of discretion. He also
argues that any increase should be barred as a "matter of policy" because it may "chill"
the exercise of a defendant's right to a hearing. Id. Both contentions are incorrect.
Defendant relies solely on a Washington state case for the proposition that the trial
court abused its discretion in conforming the restitution order to the hearing evidence. In
State v. Tindal, 748 P.2d 695, 697 (Wash. App. 1988), a restitution order was reversed
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after the appellate court determined that the "evidence [did] not establish the amount of
the victim's loss at the figure chosen by the trial judge." Contrary to defendant's
assertion, see Br.App. at 11, the Washington Court of Appeals did not hold that any prior
estimate of restitution must be taken as "fact" and never thereafter modified. Instead, the
appellate court recognized that Tindal stipulated to a set amount of restitution in the plea
agreement and, therefore, that amount was "fact" unless disproved by a preponderance of
evidence. Tindal, 748 P.2d at 696-97. Despite this "fact," the Washington court
concluded that the record did not establish "exactly what figure" was supported by the
evidence and, therefore, remanded for further proceedings. Id. at 697.
Unlike Tindal, the record in this case establishes the "exact" amount of undisputed
damages incurred as a result of defendant's criminal conduct. While the presentence
report reflected a figure of only $16,000.00, that figure was never incorporated into
defendant's plea agreement. Instead, as reflected in the presentence report, the
$16,000.00 figure represented only the victim's undocumented estimate of his damages.
In contrast, after defendant challenged the undocumented estimate, sworn testimony and
documented evidence established that the prior estimate was wrong - the true amount of
pecuniary damages was $19,646.15.
Defendant's second claim similarly lacks legal support. Citing State v. Sorenson,
639 P.2d 179 (Utah 1981), defendant asserts that permitting an upward adjustment
impermissibly "chills" the exercise of his right to a hearing. But like defendant's

13

misplaced reliance on Tindal, Sorenson is inapplicable to this case.
Sorenson involved Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405 (1999), a statute which strictly
prohibits imposition of a greater sentence once a conviction has been set aside on direct
review. See Addendum D for copy of statute. Broader than the federal or state due
process provisions, section 76-3-405
prevents the Utah constitutional right to appeal.. . from being impaired "by
imposing on a defendant who demonstrates the error of his conviction the
risk that he may be penalized with a harsher sentence for having done so."
Sorenson, 639 P.2d at 180 (quoting Chess v. Smith, 617 P.2d 341, 343 (Utah 1980)). See
also State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, ^73, 979 P.2d 799 (Utah rule ensures that "basic
constitutional right to appeal" is protected).
But by its terms, section 76-3-405 only applies when a "conviction or sentence has
been set aside on direct review or on collateral attack." See Addendum D. In contrast, a
restitution hearing is part of the original sentencing proceedings. Utah Code Ann. §§ 763-201 & 77-18-1 (Addendum D). And, while a defendant may have a constitutional right
to be heard at sentencing, State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 358-59 (Utah 1993), he has only
a statutory right to a restitution hearing. State v. Starnes, 841 P.2d 712, 715 (Utah App.
1992) (recognizing section 76-3-201 (4)(e)'s grant of a hearing but refusing to determine
any separate constitutional right). Moreover, a defendant has "no accrued right to a
sentence that exclude[s] restitution," for an order of restitution does not "increase or make
more burdensome" a previously imposed criminal sentence. Monson, 928 P.2d at 1026.
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See also Stilling, 933 P.2d at 392-93 (same). For these reasons, neither Sorenson nor
section 76-3-405 bar a trial court from increasing a restitution order following a
defendant-requested restitution hearing.
* * *

In sum, defendant requested and received an accurate determination of the victim's
pecuniary damages. That those damages were higher than originally reported does not
undermine their legal or factual validity. To the contrary, having pursued the evidentiary
course, defendant must now accept its lawful consequences.
CONCLUSION
Defendant did not preserve a challenge to the restitution order and, therefore,
appellate review is waived. Even if the issue were preserved, the order is proper. On
either ground, the February restitution order should be summarily affirmed.
DATED this /6S#day of August, 2000.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney G e n e r a l ^ ^ . . ^

CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee
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I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF
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HEINEMAN, Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, 424 East 500 South, Suite 300,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this / W ^ d a y of August, 2000.
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ADDENDA

Addendum A

THIRD DISTRICT COURT MURRAY COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

:
:

MINUTES
RESTITUTION HEARING

va.

Case NO: 991200735 FS

BENJAMIN MATTHEW NUNLEY,
Defendant.

Judges
Date:

MICHAEL K. BURTON
February 22, 2000

PRESENT
Clerk:
lindav
Prosecutor: WALSH, DAVID
Defendant
Defendant*s Attorney(a): HEINEMAN, ROBERT K
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: October 11, 1971
Audio
Tape Number:
00-128
Tape Count: 650
CHARGES
1. ATTEMPTED AGGRAVATED ASSAULT
(amended) Class A Misdemeanor
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 11/17/1999 Guilty Plea
HEARING
COUNT: 650
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Addendum B

MR. WALSH:

Adding those two, 19,416.

THE COURT:

Mr. Heineman, your

thoughts?
MR. HEINEMAN:
THE COURT:

Submit it, Judge.

Okay.

As I do the math,

I took the 12,750 and multiplied by one-and-a-half, I got
19,125 as his lost wages and lost income, and then add to
that the out-of-pocket of 521.15, I got 19,646.15.
Mr. Nunley, if I recall right, your first
payment of a thousand was coming in the end of this
month; right?
Any question you have?
MR. NUNLEY:

I—I'm confused on the

whole—the whole reason for this hearing.

I was already

sentenced to $16,000—
THE COURT:
MR. NUNLEY:

You were.
—and now it's changing

to the 19-something.
THE COURT:

19,646.15.

So, the question is?
MR. NUNLEY:

So, my amount—the

amount ~of money I'm supposed to be paying back has
changed now?
THE COURT:

Uh huh.

And what is your question?
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MR. NUNLEY:

I have a problem with

that because—
THE COURT:

Well, do you have a

question or just want to make a statement?
MR. NUNLEY:

I want to make a whole

lot of statements.
THE COURT:
MR. NUNLEY:

Okay.

Go ahead.

I talked to two

acquaintances of mine, one is a—has his master's in
plumbing, one owns his own plumbing company.
THE COURT:
MR. NUNLEY:

Uh huh.
I—I talked to them

about this situation and they said there's no way that—
that that amount is—is actual, that these invoices could
be fabricated and there could be other employees doing
the work.
THE COURT:
MR. NUNLEY:
THE COURT:

Uh huh.
There's a lot o f —
Where—where are your

knowledgeable friends today?
MR. NUNLEY:

They can come in and

testify, I asked—I asked them if they would, they said
yes.

I didn't know if they needed to be here today.

have their—their names and number.
rude—
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I

I don't mean to be

THE COURT:

How—how did you imagine

I'd know what they knew?
MR. NUNLEY:
THE COURT:

Pardon me?
I know what Mr. Pilcher

knows 'cause he speaks, I listen, I understand.
MR. NUNLEY:
THE COURT:

Okay.
You have these people

that I've never seen, heard or had anything to do with
and you want me to know what they know.

I don't

understand how you think I could do that.
MR. NUNLEY:
THE COURT:

Well—
Maybe you could explain

that to me.
MR. NUNLEY:

—my point is—is that

how can—how can—I have a whole list of these people
here that I've talked t o —
THE COURT:
MR. NUNLEY:

Uh huh.
—that are plumbers, own

plumbing companies, that are—
THE COURT:

Let me say it one more

time for you, so you'll understand.
I haven't heard from them and unless I hear
from them, how will I know what they know?
MR. NUNLEY:
people come in then?
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Well, can I have these

THE COURT:

Well, why—I don't

understand why they aren't here today?
MR. NUNLEY:

I didn't know they had

THE COURT:

Well, when did you think

to be here today.

we were talking about this?
When did you imagine that we would be hearing
from them?
MR. NUNLEY:

I was—I was wondering

if this—
THE COURT:

If not today, when did

you think it would happen?
MR. NUNLEY:

I don't know, I didn't—

I don't know how—how the Court process works as far as
getting people to come and testify or anything like that.
THE COURT:

Uh huh.

So, are you

saying you didn't know it was today, you had no idea when
it would be?
MR. NUNLEY:
would be here today.

Well, I knew—I knew I

I didn't know—

THE COURT:
MR. NUNLEY:

Uh huh.
I didn't know this would

be like this or people would be getting up on the stand
or anything like that.

I had—I don't know a whole lot

about all the court procedure for that.
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THE COURT:

So, what is it you

want from me now?

3
4

Okay.

MR. NUNLEY:

I would like--I would

like to see more substantial proof o f —

5

THE COURT:

Well, I'm comfortable

6

with the substantialness (sic) of the proof; so if you

7

have contradictory proof; is that what you're trying to

8

say?

9

story?

I've got somebody who will tell you a different

10

MR. NUNLEY:

11

THE COURT:

Right.
Yeah.

Well, I—I'm—I'm

12

happy to listen to them, so you and your attorney maybe

13

need to notice it up.

14

information from Mr. Pilcher again, 'cause we got his

15

numbers, but I mean, you're certainly entitled to present

16

something if you want to.

17

I don't think I want any

But I—I really am not probably going to listen

18

to what you think the others say and try and make a

19

conclusion from that.

20

MR. NUNLEY:

21

THE COURT:

22
23

Well—
Because going through

your filter might not be accurate.
MR. NUNLEY:

—okay.

Well, then, how

24

about if he submits like a tax—a tax return that proved

25

he made, you know, $18,000 a month.
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THE COURT:
ever asserted that.

Well, I don't think he

He said in these months that you—

3

MR. NUNLEY:

Or approximately, okay?

4

THE COURT:

—you were kind enough to

5

hit him with a baseball bat in the knee and make it so he

6

couldn't work, he lost that kind of income.

7

during those times, he didn't say, you know, he had—but

8

I think he has billables there that show a time when he

9

did less work, that that's what he got.

10

He said that

That's why I'm comfortable with the substance

11

of what he's given me; but if you have somebody who's got

12

a contradictory view, I guess I'm happy to hear that, but

13

I guess we need to have a notice, we need to know when

14

we're going to be able to do that.

15

to know that they need to be told to come.

16

MR. NUNLEY:

17

THE COURT:

18

And I guess you need

Well, that's—
And even Mr. Heineman may

take them in and talk about* how you're going to proceed,

19

Anything else, Mr. Walsh?

20 J

(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.)

21
22 |

* * *
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24
25
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Addendum D

UTAH CRIMINAL CODE

PART 2
SENTENCING
76-3-201. Sentences or combination of sentences allowed — Civil penalties — Restitution —
Hearing — Definitions.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Conviction" includes a:
(i) judgment of guilt; and
(ii) plea of guilty.
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the
defendant is convicted or any other criminal conduct for
which the defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of committing the
criminal conduct.
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages,
but not general damages, which a person could recover
against the defendant in a civil action arising out of the
facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes the money equivalent of property
taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses
including earnings and medical expenses.
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to a victim, including the
accrual of interest from the time of sentencing, insured
damages, and payment for expenses to a governmental
entity for extradition or transportation and as further
denned in Subsection (4Xc).
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has suffered pecuniary damages as a result
of the defendant's criminal activities.
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in
the defendant's criminal activities.
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may
sentence a person convicted of an offense to any one of the
following sentences or combination of them:
(a) to pay a fine;
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private
office;
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided
by law;
(d) to imprisonment;
(e) to life imprisonment;
(f) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without
parole; or
(g) to death.
(3) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority
conferred by law to:
(i) forfeit property;
(ii) dissolve a corporation;
(iii) suspend or cancel a license;
(iv) permit removal of a person from office;
(v) cite for contempt; or
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(vi) impose any other civil penalty,
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence.
(4) (a) (i) When a person is convicted of criminal activity
that has resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition
to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall
order that the defendant make restitution to victims
of crime as provided in this subsection, or for conduct
for which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea agreement. For purposes of
restitution, a victim has the meaning as defined in
Subsection (lXe).
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria and procedures
as provided in Subsections (4)(c) and (4)(d).
(iii) If the court finds the defendant owes restitution, the clerk of the court shall enter an order of
complete restitution as defined in Subsection (8)* b) on
the civil judgment docket and provide notice of the
order to the parties.
(iv) The order is considered a legal judgment enforceable under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
and the person in whose favor the restitution order is
entered may seek enforcement of the restitution
order in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. In addition, the Department of Corrections may, on behalf of the person in whose favor the
restitution order is entered, enforce the restitution
order as judgment creditor under the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
(v) If the defendant fails to obey a court order for
payment of restitution and the victim or department
elects to pursue collection of the order by civil process,
the victim shall be entitled to recover reasonable
attorney's fees.
(vi) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a
lien when recorded in a judgment docket and shall
have the same effect and is subject to the same rules
as a judgment for money in a civil action. Interest
shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of
sentencing.
(vii) The Department of Corrections shall make
rules permitting the restitution payments to be credited to principal first and the remainder of payments
credited to interest in accordance with Title 63,
Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.
(b) (i) If a defendant has been extradited to this state
under Title 77, Chapter 30, Extradition, to resolve
pending criminal charges and is convicted of criminal
activity in the county to which he has been returned,
the court may, in addition to any other sentence it
may impose, order that the defendant make restitution for costs expended by any governmental entity
for the extradition.
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall consider the criteria in Subsection
(4X0.
(c) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete restitution and court-ordered restitution.
(i) Complete restitution means the restitution necessary to compensate a victim for all losses caused by
the defendant.
(ii) Court-ordered restitution means the restitution the court having criminal jurisdiction orders the
defendant to pay as a part of the criminal sentence at
the time of sentencing.
(iii) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be determined as provided in Subsection
(8).

76-3-201.1

UTAH CRIMINAL CODE

(d) (1) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropnate under this subsection, the
court shall make the reasons for the decision a part of
the court record
(n) In any civil action brought by a victim to
enforce the judgment, the defendant shall be entitled
to offset any amounts that have been paid as part of
court-ordered restitution to the victim
(in) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a
lien when recorded m a judgment docket and shall
have the same effect and is subject to the same rules
as a judgment for money in a civil action Interest
shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of
sentencing
Civ) The Department of Corrections shall make
rules permitting the restitution payments to be credited to principal first and the remainder of payments
credited to interest in accordance with Title 63,
Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act
(e) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount,
or distribution of the restitution, the court shall at the
time of sentencing allow the defendant a full hearing on
the issue
(5) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may
impose, the court shall order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation expenses if the
defendant was
d) transported pursuant to court order from one
county to another within the state at governmental
expense to resolve pending cnminal charges,
(n) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C
misdemeanor, and
(m) convicted of a crime
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay
restitution of governmental transportation expenses if
any of the following apply
d) the defendant is charged with an infraction or
on a subsequent failure to appear a warrant is issued
for an infraction, or
(n) the defendant was not transported pursuant to
a court order
(c) (\) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Subsection (5Xa)(i) shall be calculated
according to the following schedule
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is
transported,
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is
transported, and
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is
transported
(n) The schedule of restitution under Subsection
(5)(c)( I ) applies to each defendant transported regardless of the number of defendants actually transported
in a single trip
(6) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that one of three stated minimum terms
shall be imposed, the court shall order imposition of the
term of middle seventy unless there are circumstances in
aggravation or mitigation of the crime
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party
mav submit a statement identifying circumstances in
aggravation or mitigation or presenting additional facts
If the statement is in writing, it shall be filed with the
court and served on the opposing party at least four days
prior to the time set for sentencing
(c> In determining whether there are circumstances
that justift imposition of the highest or lowest term, the
court mav consider the record in the case, the probation
officer s report other reports, including reports received
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under Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or
mitigation submitted by the prosecution or the defendant,
and any further evidence introduced at the sentencing
hearing
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts
supporting and reasons for imposing the upper or lower
term
(e) In determining a just sentence, the court shall
consider sentencing guidelines regarding aggravating and
mitigating circumstances promulgated by the Sentencing
Commission
(7) If during the commission of a crime described as child
kidnaping, rape of a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon
a child, or sexual abuse of a child, the defendant causes
substantial bodily injury to the child, and if the charge is set
forth in the information or indictment and admitted by the
defendant, or found true by a judge or jury at trial, the
defendant shall be sentenced to the highest minimum term in
state prison This subsection takes precedence over any conflicting provision of law
(8) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an
offense, the offense shall include any cnminal conduct
admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court or to
which the defendant agrees to pay restitution A victim of
an offense, that involves as an element a scheme, a
conspiracy, or a pattern of cnminal activity, includes any
person directly harmed by the defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete restitution, the court shall consider all
relevant facts, including
d) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense
resulted in damage to or loss or destruction of property of a victim of the offense,
(n) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services and devices relating to physical,
psychiatnc, and psychological care, including nonmedical care and treatment rendered m accordance
with a method of healing recognized by the law of the
place of treatment, the cost of necessary physical and
occupational therapy and rehabilitation, and the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the
offense resulted in bodily injury to a victim, and
(in) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense resulted in the death of a victim
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-ordered restitution, the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsection (8Kb) and
d) the financial resources of the defendant and the
burden that payment of restitution will impose, with
regard to the other obligations of the defendant,
(n) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution
on an installment basis or on other conditions to be
fixed by the court,
(in) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of
the payment of restitution and the method of payment, and
(IV) other circumstances which the court determines make restitution inappropnate
(d) The court may decline to make an order or may
defer e n t e n n g an order of restitution if the court determines that the complication and prolongation of the
sentencing process, as a result of considenng an order of
restitution under this subsection, substantially outweighs
the need to provide restitution to the victim
1999

76-3-201.1. Collection of criminal judgment accounts
receivable.
(1) As used in this section
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76-3-405. Limitation on sentence where conviction or
prior sentence set aside.
(1) Where a conviction or sentence has been set aside on
direct review or on collateral attack, the court shall not impose
a new sentence for the same offense or for a different offense
based on the same conduct which is more severe than the prior
sentence less the portion of the prior sentence previously
satisfied
(2) This section does not apply when
(a) the increased sentence is based on facts which were
not known to the court at the time of the original sentence, and the court affirmatively places on the record the
facts which provide the basis for the increased sentence,
or
(b) a defendant enters into a plea agreement with the
prosecution and later successfully moves to invalidate his
conviction, in which case the defendant and the prosecution stand in the same position as though the plea
bargain, conviction, and sentence had never occurred
1997

77-18-L Suspension of sentence — Pleas held in abeyance — Probation — Supervision — Presentence investigation — Standards — Confidentiality — Terms and conditions — Restitution
— Termination, revocation, modification, or
extension — Hearings — Electronic monitoring.
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant
in conjunction with a plea in abeyance agreement, the court
may hold the plea in abeyance as provided in Title 77, Chapter
2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the plea in
abeyance agreement.
(2) (a) On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no
contest, or conviction of any crime or offense, the court
may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and
place the defendant on probation. The court may place the
defendant:
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections except in cases of class C
misdemeanors or infractions;
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a private organization; or
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of
the sentencing court,
(b) (i) The legal custody of all probationers under the
supervision of the department is with the department.
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the
jurisdiction of the sentencing court is vested as ordered by the court.
(iii) The court has continuing jurisdiction over all
probationers.
(3) (a) The department shall establish supervision and
presentence investigation standards for all individuals
referred to the department. These standards shall be
based on:
(i) the type of offense,*
(ii) the demand for services;
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(iii) the availability of agency resources;
(iv) the public safety; and
(v) other criteria established by the department to
determine what level of services shall be provided.
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards
shall be submitted to the Judicial Council and the Board
of Pardons and Parole on an annual basis for review and
comment prior to adoption by the department.
(c) The Judicial Council and the department shall
establish procedures to implement the supervision and
investigation standards.
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall
annually consider modifications to the standards based
upon criteria in Subsection (3Xa) and other criteria as
they consider appropriate.
(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall
annually prepare an impact report and submit it to the
appropriate legislative appropriations subcommittee.
(4) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the department is not required to supervise the probation of persons
convicted of class B or C misdemeanors or infractions or to
conduct presentence investigation reports on class C misdemeanors or infractions. However, the department may supervise the probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance
with department standards.
(5) (a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court
may, with the concurrence of the defendant, continue the
date for the imposition of sentence for a reasonable period
of time for the purpose of obtaining a presentence investigation report from the department or information from
other sources about the defendant.
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include a
victim impact statement describing the effect of the crime
on the victim and the victim's family. The victim impact
statement shall:
(i) identify the victim of the offense;
(ii) include a specific statement of the recommended amount of complete restitution as defined in
Subsection 76-3-201(4), accompanied by a recommendationfromthe department regarding the payment of
court-ordered restitution as defined in Subsection
76-3-201(4) by the defendant;
(iii) identify any physical injury suffered by the
victim as a result of the offense along with its
seriousness and permanence;
(iv) describe any change in the victim's personal
welfare or familial relationships as a result of the
offense;
(v) identify any request for psychological services
initiated by the victim or the victim's family as a
result of the offense; and
(vi) contain any other information related to the
impact of the offense upon the victim or the victim's
family that is relevant to the trial court's sentencing
determination.
(c) The presentence investigation report shall include a
specific statement of pecuniary damages, accompanied by
a recommendation from the department regarding the
payment of restitution with interest by the defendant in
accordance with Subsection 76-3-201(4).
(d) The contents of the presentence investigation report, including any diagnostic evaluation report ordered
by the court under Section 76-3-404, are protected and are
not available except by court order for purposes of sentencing as provided by rule of the Judicial Council or for
use by the department.
(6) (a) The department shall provide the presentence in-
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and the court for review, three working days prior to
sentencing. Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence
investigation report, which have not been resolved by the
parties and the department prior to sentencing, shall be
brought to the attention of the sentencing judge, and the
judge may grant an additional ten working days to resolve
the alleged inaccuracies of the report with the department. If after ten working days the inaccuracies cannot be
resolved, the court shall make a determination of relevance and accuracy on the record.
(b) If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the
presentence investigation report at the time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered to be waived.
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any
testimony, evidence, or information the defendant or the
prosecuting attorney desires to present concerning the appropriate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information shall
be presented in open court on record and in the presence of the
defendant.
(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the
court may require that the defendant:
(a) perform any or all of the following:
(i) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at
the time of being placed on probation;
(ii) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter
32a, Defense Costs;
(iii) provide for the support of others for whose
support he is legally liable;
(iv) participate in available treatment programs;
(v) serve a period of time, not to exceed one year, in
a county jail designated by the department, after
considering any recommendation by the court as to
which jail the court finds most appropriate;
(vi) serve a term of home confinement, which may
include the use of electronic monitoring;
(vii) participate in compensatory service restitution programs, including the compensatory service
program provided in Section 78-11-20.7;
(viii) pay for the costs of investigation, probation,
and treatment services;
(ix) make restitution or reparation to the victim or
victims with interest in accordance with Subsection
76-3-201(4); and
(x) comply with other terms and conditions the
court considers appropriate; and
(b) if convicted on or after May 5, 1997:
(i) complete high school classwork and obtain *
high school graduation diploma, a GED certificate, of
a vocational certificate at the defendant's own e**
pense if the defendant has not received the diploma
GED certificate, or vocational certificate prior to
being placed on probation; or
(ii) provide documentation of the inability to obtain one of the items listed in Subsection (8)(b^
because of:
(A) a diagnosed learning disability; or
(B) other justified cause.
(9) The department shall collect and disburse the accoun
receivable as defined by Section 76-3-201.1, with interest an°
any other costs assessed under Section 64-13-21 during:
(a) the parole period and any extension of that peno°
in accordance with Subsection 77-27-6(4); and
.
(b) the probation period in cases for which the cou
orders supervised probation and any extension of W
period by the department in accordance with Subsecti0
77-18-1(10).
,e
(10) (a) (i) Probation may be terminated at any time at t^
discretion of the court or upon completion witho ^
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misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B
or C misdemeanors or infractions,
(ii) (A) If, upon expiration or termination of the
probation period under Subsection (10)(a)(i),
there remains an unpaid balance upon the account receivable as defined in Section 76-3-201.1,
the court may retain jurisdiction of the case and
continue the defendant on bench probation for
the limited purpose of enforcing the payment of
the account receivable.
(B) In accordance with Section 77-18-6, the
court shall record in the registry of civil judgments any unpaid balance not already recorded
and immediately transfer responsibility to collect
the account to the Office of State Debt Collection.
(iii) Upon motion of the Office of State Debt Collection, prosecutor, victim, or upon its own motion,
the court may require the defendant to show cause
why his failure to pay should not be treated as
contempt of court.
(b) (i) The department shall notify the sentencing
court, the Office of State Debt Collection, and the
prosecuting attorney in writing in advance in all
cases when termination of supervised probation will
occur by law.
(ii) The notification shall include a probation
progress report and complete report of details on
outstanding accounts receivable.
(11) (a) (i) Any time served by a probationer outside of
confinement after having been charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing to revoke probation does not constitute service of time toward the
total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to revoke the probation.
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a
hearing or decision concerning revocation of probation does not constitute service of time toward the
total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at the hearing.
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon
the filing of a violation report with the court alleging a
violation of the terms and conditions of probation or upon
the issuance of an order to show cause or warrant by the
court.
(12) (a) (i) Probation may not be modified or extended
except upon waiver of a hearing by the probationer or
upon a hearing and a finding in court that the
probationer has violated the conditions o^probation.
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a
hearing in court and a finding that the conditions of
probation have been violated.
(b) (i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with
particularity facts asserted to constitute violation of
the conditions of probation, the court that authorized
probation shall determine if the affidavit establishes
probable cause to believe that revocation, modification, or extension of probation is justified.
(ii) If thejiourt determines there is probable cause,
it shall cause to be served on the defendant a warrant
for his arrest or a copy of the affidavit and an order to
show cause why his probation should not be revoked,
modified, or extended.
(c) (i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and
place for the hearing and shall be served upon the
defendant at least five days prior to the hearing.
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a
continuance.
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the
defendant of a right to be represented by counsel at
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the hearing and to have counsel appointed for him if
he is indigent.
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a
right to present evidence.
(d) (i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or
deny the allegations of the affidavit.
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the
affidavit, the prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on the allegations.
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the allegations are based shall be
presented as witnesses subject to questioning by the
defendant unless the court for good cause otherwise
orders.
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and
speak in his own behalf, and present evidence.
(e) (i) After the hearing the court shall make findings
of fact.
(ii) Upon afindingthat the defendant violated the
conditions of probation, the court may order the
probation revoked, modified, continued, or that the
entire probation term commence anew.
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be
sentenced or the sentence previously imposed shall
be executed.
(13) Restitution imposed under this chapter and interest
accruing in accordance with Subsection 76-3-201(4) is considered a debt for willful and malicious injury for purposes of
exceptions listed to discharge in bankruptcy as provided in
Title 11 U.S.C.A. Sec. 523, 1985.
(14) The court may order the defendant to commit himself
to the custody of the Division of Mental Health for treatment
at the Utah State Hospital as a condition of probation or stay
of sentence, only after the superintendent of the Utah State
Hospital or his designee has certified to the court that:
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can benefit
from treatment at the state hospital;
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available for the
defendant; and
(c) persons described in Subsection 62A-12-209(2)(g)
are receiving priority for treatment over the defendants
described in this Subsection (14).
(15) Presentence investigation reports, including presentence diagnostic evaluations, are classified protected in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 2, Government Records Access
and Management Act. Notwithstanding Sections 63-2-403 and
63-2-404, the State Records Committee may not order the
disclosure of a presentence investigation report. Except for
disclosure at the time of sentencing pursuant to this section,
the department may disclose the presentence investigation
only when:
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 63-2202(7);
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other
agency approved by the department for purposes of supervision, confinement, and treatment of the offender;
(c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole;
(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or the subject's authorized representative;
or
(e) requested by the victim of the crime discussed in the
presentence investigation report or the victim's authorized representative, provided that the disclosure to the
victim shall include only information relating to statements or materials provided by the victim, to the circumstances of the crime including statements by the defendant, or to the impact of the crime on the victim or the
victim's household.

(16) (a) The court shall consider home confinement as a
condition of probation under the supervision of the department, except as provided in Sections 76-3-406 and
76-5-406.5.
(b) The department shall establish procedures and
standards for home confinement, including electronic
monitoring, for all individuals referred to the department
in accordance with Subsection (17).
(17) (a) If the court places the defendant on probation
under this section, it may order the defendant to participate in home confinement through the use of electronic
monitoring as described in this section until further order
of the court.
(b) The electronic monitoring shall alert the department and the appropriate law enforcement unit of the
defendant's whereabouts.
(c) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions which require:
(i) the defendant to wear an electronic monitoring
device at all times; and
(ii) that a device be placed in the home of the
defendant, so that the defendant's compliance with
the court's order may be monitored.
(d) If a court orders a defendant to participate in home
confinement through electronic monitoring as a condition
9f probation under this section, it shall:
(i) place the defendant on probation under the
supervision of the Department of Corrections;
(ii) order the department to place an electronic
monitoring device on the defendant and install electronic monitoring equipment in the residence of the
defendant; and
(iii) order the defendant to pay the costs associated
with home confinement to the department or the
program provider.
(e) The department shall pay the costs of home confinement through electronic monitoring only for those persons
who have been determined to be indigent by the court.
(f) The department may provide the electronic monitoring described in this section either directly or by
contract with a private provider.
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